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Glossary 
 
Balance of payments: the difference between total payments to foreign nations 
arising from imports of finance, goods etc and total receipts from foreign nations from 
exports of finance, goods, etc 
Civil society: those organizations that form part of the political sphere, but which lie 
outside the state and market (cross refer to other entries) 
Cold War: the period between the end of World War II and the late 1980s when the 
world was divided between the two Superpowers of the US and USSR (cross refer to 
other entries) 
Conditionality: the practice by the major international lenders of attaching policy 
conditions to loans 
Governance: a way of organizing policy making and rule through networks of actors 
rather than simply by the institutions of state (cross refer to other entries) 
Informal sector: the area of economic activity which lies outside of the state 
regulated system and is characterized by self-employment and small scale (cross 
refer to other entries) 
Keynesian(ism): economic policy named after the economist John Maynard Keynes, 
which favors state intervention in correcting market failures and was practiced in the 
immediate post-World War II period. 
Neo-colonialism: the persistence of external control in the formerly colonized world 
by foreign governments and transnational corporations (cross refer to other entries) 
Privatization: the sale of once state owned enterprises to capitalist firms (cross refer 
to other entries) 
 
Synopsis 
Structural adjustment may sound technical, but refers to the comprehensive 
economic programs that the major international lenders require of developing 
countries when they are granted a loan.  These structural adjustment programs – 
called SAPs - require liberalization of the economy so that markets can function more 
easily and the recipient countries are more open to foreign investment.  The impacts 
of these programs have been limited with a few success stories, and in the main 
produced negligible or negative impacts.  Worst hit are the poor and vulnerable, who 
suffer unemployment, job insecurity, rising prices, reduced services, and ecological 
marginalization.  Politically, SAPs signal a further erosion of sovereignty for 
developing countries and they create parallel governments run by unaccountable 
technical experts.  This centralization is set against claims to decentralize control and 
decision-making to the localities.  SAPs have changed name in the last decade, but 
are set to stay a key part of the international development scene. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Structural adjustment sounds like a highly technical idea, which appears benign, 
even boring.  But it is a generic term that refers to a set of programmes that seek to 
restructure the economies of countries in the developing world or in transition; literally 
adjusting the structure of national economic life.  These programmes are 
comprehensive and affect everything from government economic policy to ownership 
of firms and the price of essential services.  They are based on a set of neo-liberal 
economic principles that were first practised from the 1970s and 1980s in a number 
of ‘developed’ economies before being exported to the developing world.  For these 
reasons, this apparently unassuming concept affects us all, but has its greatest 
impact on the poorer sections of society across the world.  Structural adjustment 
programs, or SAPs, are orchestrated by the major international lenders – the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank – in which policy conditions are 
attached to loans to indebted and impoverished countries.  In this way the financial 
power of these institutions is central to policy-making in developing countries and 
continues a long history of external interventions in the developing world, which 
raises vital questions about sovereignty in a globalising world. 
 
Understanding the dynamics of structural adjustment reveals two important 
geographical themes.  The first concerns long-standing interdependencies across 
space.  A persistent feature of the international system has been the way in which 
capitalist expansion and political intervention has generated uneven development.  
Within this system, through both formal colonisation and less obvious neo-
colonialism (glossary), countries in the global South have been subject to unequal 
terms of trade and political interference in their affairs of state.  While not exonerating 
these countries’ leaders they have in effect been ‘hemmed in’ within the global 
economy, leaving little space for manoeuvre.  Structural adjustment, therefore, 
reflects the latest phase in this unequal relationship.   
 
The second issue concerns the uneven geographical expression of neo-liberalism.  
Although, neo-liberalism is based on a set of universal principles and is a term 
bandied around as if the neo-liberal condition were uniform, the realisation of neo-
liberalism is shaped by differences within and between states and societies.  So, 
while we discuss general trends, the real world geography of neo-liberalisation is 
uneven and deeply political.  The key, and crudely stated, difference between the 
neo-liberalisation occurring in the global North and that in the South is that in the 
former it has been driven by domestic political elites within nominally democratic 
systems whereas in the latter it has been forced on impoverished populations by the 
same political elites acting through multilateral organisations alongside their cronies 
in these developing countries. 
 
I start by tracing the emergence of structural adjustment before outlining what makes 
up a typical SAP.  We then look at the major effects of SAPs and then at how the 
politics of the policies operates and is contested. 
 
The neo-liberal turn and the underlying principles of SAPs 
Structural adjustment programs are based on a neo-liberal set of assumptions.  Here 
we examine the genesis of SAPs from the 1970s right up to the current period, 
where, despite changes in name and emphasis, SAPs are still very much in 
evidence. 
 
SAPs are based on a belief that free markets can deliver the best route to prosperity 
and development. In terms of economic policy the post-War period up to the early 
1970s was broadly characterised as one of Keynesianism (glossary, which saw a 
role for state to balance out economic cycles and protect the marginalised.  By 
contrast, neo-liberalism believes in a minimalist state and a faith that open and 
unfettered economies can generate growth, which will eventually trickle down to the 
poorest.   
 
While Keynesian policy was focused on national economies, international economic 
regulation in the post-War period was through a system called the Gold Standard, 
which pegged currencies to the value of gold and prevented wild speculation.  
Additionally, a system of international economic institutions was created to avoid 
volatility.  The architecture of this was laid down at a conference at the Bretton 
Woods ski resort in the USA, so that this complex of regulatory bodies became 
known as the Bretton Woods Institutions and included the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (more 
usually called The World Bank), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), which later became the World Trade Organisation (WTO).  In different ways 
these institutions sought to regulate international economic flows and were governed 
by representatives of the countries that contributed finances. 
 
By the early 1970s pressures had mounted which saw a gradual dismantling of the 
Keynesian regulatory system.  The Gold Standard was abandoned and currency 
movement became easier, in many developed economies inflation and labour unrest 
was distressing governments, and an oil crisis forced an international recession.  
This was set against Cold War (glossary) polarities, which saw aid and (often covert) 
military support for regimes that professed support for one of the Superpowers.   
 
In September 1973, a US-backed coup d’etat in Chile ousted the left-leaning 
Salvador Allende and replaced him with General Pinochet.  Pinochet and his allies in 
the US put in place an economic model that removed labour regulations and brutally 
suppressed dissent.  The intellectual support came from a group of economists 
based in the University of Chicago and led by Milton Friedman.  These ‘Chicago 
Boys’ were the architects of the neo-liberal policies in Chile, which acted as a test-
bed for ideas that would soon come to dominate policy. 
 
Internationally the oil crisis of the early 1970s generated a recession but also huge 
profits for oil producers.  With lots of money in the bank, but fewer productive outlets 
in the capitalist core, bankers looked for other avenues for profitable investment.  
These so-called petrodollars were leant to developing countries at relatively low 
interest rates.  In the late 1970s, as one of the earliest neo-liberal attacks on inflation 
in the core economies, interest rates were raised rapidly.  For those developing 
countries with loans from Northern banks this created a massive and unsustainable 
debt problem with Mexico famously declaring itself bankrupt and unable to repay in 
1982.  For the banks this was a huge (and embarrassing) issue that could threaten 
the legitimacy of the international financial system and the privileges of wealth it 
secured.  Hence, a mechanism was needed to repay the debt, which ensured that 
these economies did not decline further so that funds were available for debt 
servicing.  It is here that structural adjustment arrives. 
 
Given that state financing was available commercially, the Bretton Woods Institutions 
had to ‘reinvent’ themselves as development agencies whose main work was in the 
developing world, and from the late 1980s the former Soviet Bloc as well.  Their role 
became that of ensuring the steady repayment of debt and the inculcation of neo-
liberal economic ‘openness’, which they did by attaching policy conditions to the 
concessional loans they granted to developing countries.  It was following the neo-
liberal turns in the USA, UK and Germany that the Bretton Woods Institutions 
formally introduced structural adjustment programmes in the early 1980s. 
 
Although set up in Bretton Woods, these institutions are all based in Washington DC.  
The orthodoxy that came to dominate their relationships with the developing world 
became known as the Washington Consensus and enforced a dogmatic reading of 
neo-liberal policy as part of their conditions.  This started in the early 1980s and was 
in full flow by the middle of that decade.  We will look at the content and impacts of 
SAPs below, but suffice to say that they created controversy and hardship for many.   
 
As a result of limited impacts, theoretical critique and active resistance, the 1990s 
saw a softening on the hard neo-liberal line.  The discourse shifted away from 
growth-at-any-costs liberalization to poverty eradication by a more diverse set of 
means, although never displacing the centrality of the market mechanism.  This saw 
structural adjustment programs falling out of circulation as a term to describe neo-
liberal policies and being replaced by a new, but very similar, initiative called Poverty 
Reduction Strategies (PRSs).  In order to fully appreciate how structural adjustment 
operates and the difference that geographical context makes we need to understand 
what a SAP actually looks like. 
 
What is structural adjustment? 
At the heart of SAPs is liberalization of the economy.  It is based on the persuasive 
discourse of freedom and self-sufficiency, that human beings are by nature driven by 
self-interest and that anything which prevents the realisation of this potential is 
wrong.  For the neo-liberals the main target was the state, which they believed 
impeded national and international markets and created dependency among the poor 
on state welfare.   
 
The 1970s saw the intellectual refinement of this attack on the state with full-blown 
SAPs emerging in the early 1980s.  A typical SAP contains the following elements: 
 
• Tariff barriers, which had been set high to protect local production, are 
removed to promote competition from imports with a view to kick-starting local 
producers into efficient production.   
• Export promotion is also encouraged by pushing for key commodities, 
especially agricultural goods, to be produced, which diverts efforts away from 
production for local consumption. 
• Devaluation of the national currency, which is often overvalued, to make 
exports cheaper on the global market and imports more expensive, which 
encourages exports over imports to correct the balance of payments deficit. 
• Financial liberalization to allow freer inward and outward flows of international 
capital as well as a removal of restrictions on what foreign businesses and 
banks can own or operate. 
• Subsidies are removed in order to remove market distortions and overcome 
the dependency of the poor on state welfare. 
• User fees are levied on key services as a way of ‘recovering’ the costs and 
reducing the burden on tax revenue.  On the other side of the fiscal equation 
services are cut back to reduce government spending. 
• Bureaucracies are trimmed down and other state workers laid off to reduce 
the government’s wage bill.  Bureaucracies are also to be made more efficient 
and less corrupt under the ‘good governance’ (glossary) initiatives that 
followed SAPs. 
• Privatization (glossary) is introduced as a way of enhancing competitiveness 
and efficiency, and reducing the burden on the state of sapping and corrupt 
state-owned industries (SOIs).  With liberalization, heavily defended national 
economies are now open to possible inward investment to buy up these SOIs. 
 
Ideally, the upshot of stabilization and liberalization is that the economy opens up 
and the state reduces spending, which provides a conducive environment for foreign 
firms and releases finances for debt repayment. 
 
In terms of implementing a SAP there was a division of labour between the IMF and 
World Bank, with the former following its historical remit of macro-economic 
stabilization and adjustment and the latter focusing more on sectoral problems, such 
as industrial strategy, and supply-side bottlenecks, like poor infrastructure.  In 
practice the two institutions worked closely together.  What is crucial about IMF 
agreements is that they signalled to other lenders that a particular country was loan 
worthy.  While total IMF lending to a country may not have been huge, it was 
necessary in order to access other concessional lending. 
 
The high-point of SAPs was the mid-late 1980s whereby 64 countries had a SAP in 
place. On-going resistance within recipient governments to SAPs saw the addition of 
a political dimension to these economic programs in the shape of ‘good governance’ 
initiatives.  As corruption and mismanagement were seen to be impeding SAPs, 
attention turned in the early-1990s to reforming the bureaucracy and giving greater 
voice to potentially pro-market elements within ‘civil society’ (glossary).  At the same 
time, changes in government in the UK and USA ushered in a social democratic 
model, which was still very much pro-market but conceded that for those excluded 
from the benefits of markets some form of market-based supports were needed to 
protect them.   
 
A further development was around debt.  After over a decade of SAPs it became 
apparent that most countries were still mired in debt and barely keeping up with 
repayments.  Concerted international lobbying forced a move towards debt reduction 
and further concessions to indebted countries, which became tied into the adjustment 
agenda.  The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative started in the mid-
1990s and was aimed at those countries in severe debt, but who also showed the 
necessary commitment to neo-liberal reforms.  Once these countries demonstrated a 
‘rational’ plan for implementing neo-liberal policies and made the necessary moves 
towards ‘good governance’, they passed the HIPC ‘decision point’ when further 
concessions would be made.    
 
In terms of international policy all this produced the ‘post-Washington Consensus’ 
with a shift away from hardline conditionality (glossary) and an exclusive growth-
orientation towards greater ‘participation’ in policy-making by both recipient 
governments and their people.  The response was Poverty Reduction Strategies 
(PRSs) that were introduced in the late 1990s.  According to their initiators in the 
Bretton Woods Institutions PRSs are country-driven, results-oriented, 
comprehensive, partnership-oriented and long-term.  They are seen to reverse the 
draconian conditionality of SAPs, which made a set of policies conditional on taking a 
loan.  By contrast, PRSs favour ‘smart’ conditionality, which assesses each country’s 
institutional and financial worthiness and then awards a loan accordingly.  One 
important change is that rather than giving funds for specific projects, such as the 
revamping of a port facility, they are given directly to the national treasury to be spent 
in accordance with the home-grown adjustment program set out in the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).  This so-called ‘direct budget support’ appears to 
give greater control to recipient governments, but despite this rhetoric of ownership 
all PRSs contain the same elements as SAPs in terms of liberalization and cost 
recovery.  
 
Impacts and effects 
Although neo-liberalism is usually talked about in universal terms, its elaboration and 
effects are locally specific.  Here we review some of the key impacts of SAPs, while 
trying to capture these complex patterns.  Analysis is difficult for various reasons.  
First, is the counterfactual problem, because we can never know what would have 
happened to the economy had SAPs never been implemented.  The usual approach 
is simply to take ‘before’ and ‘after’ snapshots of key indicators to try and capture 
what impacts SAPs have had.  Second, SAPs focused on domestic conditions and 
constraints, whereas economic performance is also affected by global conditions so it 
is hard to separate out which effects were produced by what factors.  Third, data for 
many developing countries are poor so calculating impacts is always difficult.  
However, qualitative data is often used to get behind the aggregate trends. We begin 
with aggregate trends before disaggregating the impacts of major reform areas. 
 
Table 1 shows the performance of countries classified as ‘strong adjustors’ meaning 
a commitment to SAPs and receiving many loans.  It shows that contrary to the 
objective of ‘adjustment with growth’, the recipients of adjustment loans had the 
same near-zero per capita growth rates as the overall developing country sample. In 
the worst cases, there were very poor macroeconomic outcomes although the best 
cases showed that growth was possible.  However, there were no cases where 
growth was reasonable and all macroeconomic imbalances were under control for 
the adjustment lending period. For example, by 1992 Uganda had shown good 
growth, but erratic and high inflation, despite having received 14 adjustment loans.  
 
Table 1: Performance indicators for a sample of adjusting countries 
 
Country Average per capita 
growth rate, from first 
SAP to 1999 
Africa 
Niger -2.3% 
Zambia -2.1% 
Madagascar -1.8% 
Togo -1.6% 
Cote d’Ivoire -1.4% 
Malawi -0.2% 
Mali -0.1% 
Mauritania 0.1% 
Senegal 0.1% 
Kenya 0.1% 
Ghana 1.2% 
Uganda 2.3% 
 
Other developing countries 
Bolivia -0.4% 
Philippines 0.0% 
Jamaica 0.4% 
Mexico 0.4% 
Argentina 1.0% 
Morocco 1.1% 
Bangladesh 2.4% 
Pakistan 2.7% 
  
Minimum in the top 20 -2.3% 
Average top 20 0.1% 
Maximum in the top 20 2.7% 
Average all developing countries 0.3% 
 
Transition countries 
Ukraine -8.4% 
Russian Federation -5.7% 
Kyrgyz Republic -4.4% 
Kazakhstan -3.1% 
Bulgaria -2.2% 
Romania -1.2% 
Hungary 1.0% 
Poland 3.4% 
Albania 4.4% 
Georgia 6.4% 
  
Minimum -8.4% 
Median -1.7% 
Maximum 6.4% 
 
Source: William Easterly (2002) What did structural adjustment adjust? The 
association of policies and growth with repeated IMF and World Bank adjustment 
loans, Center for Global Development, Institute for International Economics, August 
2002, www.cgdev.org/content/publicatons/detail/2779 
 
This strong adjustment lending group includes some notable disasters. Zambia 
received 18 adjustment loans but had sharp negative growth, large current account 
and budget deficits, high inflation, massive overvaluation of the currency, and a 
negative real interest rate. In other regions, there were also problem cases. After the 
initiation of adjustment lending, Bolivia had hyperinflation, negative real interest rates, 
and overvaluation. Even when Bolivia stabilized inflation in 1987, growth was poor, 
interest rates swung from excessively negative to excessively positive, and 
overvaluation remained.  
 
The ex-Communist ‘transition’ countries only received adjustment loans in the 1990s 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the break-up of the USSR. Their average growth 
was –1.7 percent per annum, showing an overall decline. Six of the countries had 
negative per capita growth and four had positive growth after the initiation of SAP 
lending. Only Poland and Hungary are clear success stories.  
 
At one level SAPs have been successful in ensuring debts are repaid.  This net 
transfer of finance from the poor to rich countries can be viewed as a form of tribute, 
not dissimilar to the actions of colonial governments in the 19th and 20th Centuries.  In 
development speak adjusting countries service their debt, which when measured 
against economic activity (GDP) gives a ‘debt service ratio’.  The higher the ratio, the 
greater percentage of a country’s income goes on paying off loans.  An example of 
the typical impacts of SAPs is Ghana.  In 1983, at the start of the first SAP, its debt 
service ratio was 0.81% but jumped to 10.82% in 1987 meaning that one dollar in 
nine went on repayments to the lenders.   It was the recognition of this crippling debt 
servicing that forced HIPC and related moves. 
 
Trade liberalization aims to enhance exports and encourage competition from 
imports to promote domestic industries.  All countries with a SAP put such provisions 
in place and, in general, their exports did rise.  In keeping with theories of 
comparative advantage countries were encouraged to produce in sectors where they 
had an advantage, which often meant relying on a narrow range of products, such as 
one or two commodity crops.  So, adjusting economies rarely diversified to develop 
inter-sectoral linkages or a more robust portfolio of different activities.  The rise in 
exports was set against a rise in imports, which meant that the overall balance of 
payments (glossary) position did not improve.  Many of these imports are finished 
consumer goods rather than intermediate capital goods that would be used in 
domestic manufacturing, which means they usually displaced comparable local 
products that may be more expensive or poorer quality.  The net effect of this is 
deindustrialization where the number of firms declines, production falls away even 
more, unemployment rises, and purchasing power in the local economy is reduced. 
Sectorally there has been a shift away from manufacturing to services, but local firms 
often lack the expertise, which opens the market up to foreign firms.  And as larger 
and more formal firms close this releases labour, which cannot be absorbed and is 
forced to enter the informal sector and rely on a range of risky survival strategies. So, 
those worse affected by trade liberalization are smallholder farmers who cannot 
produce for export, very small manufacturing enterprises, and semi-skilled labour. 
 
In terms of financial liberalization the SAPs aimed to reform interest rates, ease the 
flow of funds in and out of countries, and make credit easier to access.  These are 
basically about deregulating the financial sector.  A key outcome is that while these 
regulations have been relaxed, only those people and businesses with a sound 
financial footing have been able to capitalise on these opportunities, leading to 
concentration of ownership and the further enrichment of the already rich at the 
expense of the poorer section of society.  Particularly badly hit have been small and 
medium sized enterprises that lacked sufficient collateral for loans.  Many of these 
are women-run, so the effects of financial liberalization were felt worse by them.  The 
wealthiest who could gain credit often used a portion of this on non-productive 
consumption, which raised demand for foreign imports over local goods, thereby 
exacerbating the effects of trade liberalization. 
 
We have seen how competition from imports, amongst other things, undermined 
local producers.  But other changes such as privatization and labour market reforms 
have also impacted on the poorest in adjusting countries.  In countries with a well 
established manufacturing base jobs that were created were often in ‘flexible’ and 
semi-skilled industries, which meant that labor has low pay, few rights, and little job 
security.  Again, this changed labor market was gendered with women usually taking 
the jobs in manufacturing and subject to harsh labor conditions.  The export drive of 
SAPs also pushes the economy into specialisation, which renders some sectors 
unviable.  For example, where agricultural production is not for export, it becomes 
obsolete and generates rural unemployment and a concomitant rise in rural-urban 
migration, which undermines rural communities.  And as unemployment rises, 
households are forced into securing income and resources from wherever they can, 
which can mean forcing children into informal and risky jobs. 
 
 
 
Privatization was intended to enhance the competitiveness of the economy and 
reduce the liability on the state of inefficient enterprises.  SAP countries tended to 
produce an audit of their state-owned industries (SOIs), get them into reasonable 
financial shape, and then offer them for sale on international markets.  Typically 
these included hotels, heavy industry and commodity processing plants, and 
infrastructures like telecommunications, water and electricity.  Privatization has had 
mixed results, with efficiency rising in some and a reduction in the state’s obligations 
coupled with a rise in taxable income.  In general, the best SOIs were cherry picked 
by foreign investors which meant that profits leave the country.  Socially, the move 
towards efficiency resulted in streamlining practices and getting rid of unwanted 
labor, which adds to unemployment levels.  Additionally, in most cases, the prices for 
privatized services like phones rose after privatization pushing them further out of 
reach of the poor.  In this respect, water has been the most difficult and contested as 
it is obviously vital to life and costing it out of reach of the poor makes humane living 
near impossible. 
 
 
 
Cut-backs in social spending and the re-pricing of government services are designed 
to balance the government’s books and free up funds for debt repayment.  In 
practice, this means reduced funding for education and health in particular, which 
clearly has major knock-on effects for society and economy.  The introduction of user 
fees for these basic services puts them out of reach of the poorest in society, which 
further deepens their exclusion and poverty.  These effects were so visible in the 
early days of adjustment that a landmark publication called ‘Adjustment with a human 
face’ was published in 1987, which highlighted the impacts on the poor and 
vulnerable and called for the introduction of social safety nets to protect people 
during the supposedly harsh, but temporary, adjustment process. The social 
protection schemes were rolled out with much fanfare, but donor funding was quite 
limited and by making access conditional upon certain workfare practices they also 
served to reinforce a pro-market logic. 
 
Agricultural promotion was also geared to exporting cash crops at the expense of 
locally consumed food crops.  Additionally, to enhance the market competitiveness of 
the sector subsidies on key inputs such as fertilizer were cut.  This has major 
livelihood and environmental consequences.  Poorer farmers who could no longer 
afford inputs saw yields decline, which reduced income and food security.  It also 
meant that larger farmers who had the initial capital or could access credit were able 
to consolidate their position and expand at the expense of smaller farmers.  This 
often meant taking over the best land and forcing the poorest onto even more 
marginal land, which was more prone to environmental degradation, thereby fuelling 
a vicious cycle of poverty and degradation.  The focus on cash crops also 
encouraged mono-cropping, that reduced biodiversity and with it an increase in the 
susceptibility of crops to disease.  Similar trends were seen in mineral extraction as 
mining enterprises expanded operations at the expense of agricultural land, not to 
mention the pollution problems associated with under-regulated heavy industry.  
Overall, food production for local consumption was negatively affected by these 
reforms, which saw a consolidation and specialization of production. 
 
While it is difficult to generalise about the aggregate impacts of SAPs, compared to 
their stated aims there was limited or negative economic growth, increased social 
polarisation, and enhanced foreign ownership.  However, debt has been serviced.  
Within these general impacts women and children were the worst affected.    So the 
economic pie did not increase much in size, but the richest peoples’ share of the pie 
got bigger.   
 
As we have seen the PRSs promise a big change from the SAPs of the 1980s and 
1990s.  While it is a little early to say with any precision what the effects have been, 
there is a lack of clarity over how they will contribute to poverty reduction as opposed 
simply to stabilization and growth.  By and large the strategies still focus on economic 
growth without really addressing how any growth is to be redistributed to the poor. At 
their heart are the same macro-economic prescriptions of the old structural 
adjustment programs with a continued emphasis on privatization, liberalization and a 
reduced role for the state. 
 
‘It’s not right for a bank to run the whole world’1: The politics of sovereignty and 
accountability 
So far we have looked at the economic effects of SAPs, but as is clear they are so 
far-reaching that their formulation and implementation is also highly political.  Here 
we will focus on the politics of SAP intervention, which affects national sovereignty 
and promotes accountability to the donors despite a countervailing rhetoric of 
democratisation and self-determination. 
 
A key paradox of structural adjustment is that the creation of ‘free’ markets 
unencumbered by state regulation requires a great deal of state-based politicking, 
encompassing both the use of raw power and the less obvious deployment of 
theoretical discourses.  The Bretton Woods Institutions are bound, in theory, to non-
interference in the politics of sovereign countries, yet conditionality shows that they 
are central to the decision-making of many countries.  At the national level we see 
the state heavily involved in the withdrawal of the state from regulation and service 
delivery. Rather than disappearing, the state is restructured to form a parallel 
government run by insulated and unaccountable technocrats, most often located in 
the finance ministries.  On the other hand much is made in the neo-liberal armoury of 
devolution to enhance ‘choice’ at the local level which runs counter to the massive 
centralisation of power that the implementation of SAPs require. 
 
This polemic of devolution within SAPs suggests that local governance is to be a key 
arena for enhancing political choice.  This localism has seen a whole host of political 
experiments centred on ‘civil society’, ‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’.  These 
positive and radical sounding concepts promise local self-determination, but prove to 
be about marketizing services such as education, by-passing the central state which 
has in many cases proven obstructive to liberalization, and as a vehicle for promoting 
certain civil society organisations that are known to be pro-market.  As a result 
‘choice’ through devolution is part of the wider move to create markets and weaken 
opposition to SAPs, while all the time couching it in a language of empowerment. 
 
This localism has proven to be one of the mainstays of the ‘good governance’ 
programs already mentioned.  After nearly a decade of SAPs it was realised that key 
elements within the recipient states were blocking the reform agenda, which meant 
the donors needed to also focus on reforming the political and bureaucratic process.  
These factions needed to be removed or bypassed, which led to a whole raft of 
political reforms such as downsizing bureaucracies, removing key individuals, 
insulating decision-making, and using external consultants to provide ‘objective’ 
analysis of what needed to be changed. These programs were always couched in 
                                                 
1
 Fred M’membe, editor of the Zambia Post, quoted in Structural Adjustment – a Major Cause 
of Poverty, www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/SAP.asp?p=1 
terms of accountability and transparency, and were tied to democratisation agendas 
that also promised accountability.  Again, what is ironic is that these moves were 
forced as part of the loan conditionality, which runs against any definition of 
democratic politics, and can only ever be justified through an assertion of the moral 
superiority of western political models and a concomitant demonization of developing 
countries as irrational and corrupt. 
 
With the PRSs this upward accountability to donors is supposedly reversed, as 
recipient countries now ‘own’ their own adjustment programs.  As we have seen, 
despite the promise of local input to program design, which should produce different 
policy mixes, all PRSs look stunningly similar.  The shift to supposedly smart 
conditionality and direct budget support has not reversed the accountability to donors 
who still pull the strings and undermine the domestic democratisation they work so 
hard to champion.  Rather than brutal conditionality the language has shifted to 
compliance, yet a whole system of checks are in place – most notably Country Policy 
Institutional Assessments - to ensure that recipient countries are trustworthy before 
loans are approved and that annual approvals are made in order for funds to be 
released. 
 
However, these harsh economic conditions and political meddling have not gone 
unopposed.  As the neo-liberal model creates authoritarian, centralised, and 
unaccountable politics ordinary people are often forced into direct action.  Dubbed 
‘IMF riots’ these protests combine genuine anxiety over austerity-driven economic 
hardships with a frustration at the way in which national sovereignty has been 
usurped by the Bretton Woods Institutions and their cabal of donors.  These have 
been occurring since the start of the SAP era, and more recently fed into the 
worldwide ‘anti-globalisation’ movements. 
 
Figure **: An anti-IMF protest in the USA 
 
 
 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/04/12/world/main687657.shtml 
 
Conclusion 
Structural adjustment is a critical issue for the lives of many in the developing world.  
It is a process linked to older trajectories within the international political economy, 
which are about uneven interdependencies across space.  The developing world is 
further hemmed in by SAPs and complex multi-levelled governance sees national 
sovereignty being usurped by international organisations acting in the name of the 
poor.  They also espouse localism as a way of enhancing choice and freedom, but 
this proves to be a smokescreen for destatization.  By understanding this complex 
economic and political geography we get an insight into how neo-liberalization 
operates so that it appears everywhere and nowhere at the same time.  Think back 
across this short paper and list the places and countries that are implicated in the 
story of structural adjustment. 
 
Since the so-called ‘war on terror’ began, the economic well-being of the global poor 
has taken on a new significance since poverty is believed to breed grievances, as the 
poor in the South witness with growing envy the lifestyle of the North.  Hence, the 
poverty focus of adjustment programs is now also about maintaining the security of 
the North by preventing these grievances building up.  Under this war footing the 
neo-liberal governance prerequisites become even more important, because they 
signal a commitment to like-minded (read US) values.  Muddying the waters further is 
China’s rise in global economics and politics, which potentially provides an 
alternative to structural adjustment.  The Chinese government is ready to lend to 
developing countries and enter partnerships and joint ventures unencumbered by the 
same ideological baggage and the burden of debt repayment.  All this means that 
structural adjustment is set to continue, but is likely to change yet further. 
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Websites 
These two Bretton Woods Institutions are the architects of SAPs, and have much 
information in the form of factsheets, as we well as their own policy analysis. 
http://www.worldbank.org 
http://www.imf.org 
 
These two organizations have done more independent evaluation work on SAPs and 
PRSs. 
http://www.saprin.org 
http://www.odi.org.uk 
 
The following are campaigning and advocacy NGOs, who are either very critical of 
SAPs/PRSs or call for more piecemeal reform. 
http://www.essentialaction.org 
http://www.globalissues.org 
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org 
http://www.50years.org 
http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk 
http://www.tjm.org.uk (trade justice movement) 
http://www.wdm.org.uk (world development movement) 
 
Suggestions for cross-references  
In the order they appear on the spreadsheet 
• Civil society 
• Cold War 
• Debt  
• Dependency 
• Good governance  
• Informal sector 
• Neo-liberalism and development  
• Neocolonialism 
• Third World 
• FDI and industrial restructuring 
• International organisations 
• Privatization 
• TNCs and developing countries 
• Uneven development 
• Africa 
• Communist and post-Communist geographies 
• Governance 
• Neo-liberalism 
• Sovereignty 
• De-industrialization 
 
